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Abstract 
 
In this paper I argue that the specific musical authenticity of improvisation in different 
kinds of music (especially, but not only, in Jazz and Free improvisation practices) consists 
of what I call ‘being true to the moment’ and that since the artistic success of every musical 
performance requires performers’ attentiveness and responsiveness to the moment of 
the performance, improvisational authenticity is the epitome of musical authenticity. 
I proceed as follows. Firstly I present Peter Kivy’s plural view of musical authenticity 
and discuss Julian Dodd’s view of musical improvisation as essentially inauthentic. 
Then, I articulate two notions of improvisational authenticity, ontological and expressive 
authenticity, which I develop by means of a third, and crucial, notion of improvisational 
authenticity: truthfulness to the moment, which is the specific way improvisation realizes 
a fourth kind of authenticity: artistic authenticity. Finally, I argue that improvisational 
authenticity is paradigmatic for the authenticity of musical performance as performance. 
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1. Musical Authenticities 
 
Scholars, musicians and listeners highlight authenticity as an important 
artistic value of improvised music.1 But, is there a specific sense of authentic-
ity that is valid for musical improvisation? I think that the specific musical 
authenticity of improvisation in different kinds of music (especially, but not 
only, in Jazz and Free improvisation practices) consists in ‘being true to the 
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moment,’ i.e. in improvisers’ attentiveness and responsiveness to the mo-
ment of the performance. Moreover, since the artistic success of every musi-
cal performance requires performers to be attentive and responsive toward 
the performance situation, I think that improvisational authenticity is the 
epitome of musical authenticity. Finally, I believe that the negotiation of 
the normativity of the practice in relation to the situation of the artistic pro-
duction is an important aspect of artistic normativity in general, and that for 
this reason the ‘truthfulness to the moment’ of improvisation exhibits a key 
aspect of artistic authenticity. In order to argue in favor of these views, I will 
begin by briefly presenting the topic of musical authenticity. 
For this purpose, it is advisable to start with Peter Kivy’s conceptual ar-
ticulation. Although Kivy refers to Western classical music, his analytical 
discussion is also a good starting point for reflecting on authenticity in 
reference to the broad field of improvisational practices. According to Kivy, 
the notion of authenticity can apply to music in at least four ways: 1. “faith-
fulness to the composer’s personal intentions;” 2. “faithfulness to the per-
formance practice of the composer’s lifetime;” 3. “faithfulness to the sounds 
of a performance during the composer’s lifetime;” 4. “faithfulness to the per-
former’s own self, original, not derivative, or an aping of someone else’s way 
of playing” (Kivy 1995, 6–7). The polemical aim of the book was the so-called 
“movement for historically authentic performance” and its strong defense 
of the W e r k t r e u e  i d e a l:2 the truthfulness to the text of the musical 
work.  
Roughly, the first three notions of musical authenticity can be considered 
as expressions of the ideal of authenticity as truthfulness to the work. Kivy 
argues that this ideal is not a necessary criterion for the artistic quality of 
a musical performance. Rather, the artistic quality of a musical performance 
necessarily requires the fourth type of authenticity (which does not only 
concern musical performances, but works of art), through which performers 
achieve two of the most admired artistic qualities: style and originality 
(see Kivy 1995, 123).  Kivy believes that expressive authenticity, as he calls 
it, is compatible with, and often even required by, respect for the composer’s 
intentions, and he claims that authenticity is, generally speaking, a trade-off: 
if the rate of authenticity as fidelity to the author’s intentions or to the histor-
ical sonority increases, that of expressive authenticity diminishes, and vice 
versa. Moreover, he denies that the artistically-better performance is neces-
sarily the one that respects the composer’s intentions. On the one hand, 
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moral reasons in favor of respect for the composer’s intentions can be bal-
anced by other moral reasons, such as respect for the listeners. On the other 
hand, fidelity to the composer’s intentions (assuming we can have access 
to them) is no guarantee of the best artistic quality of the performance of 
a work. Furthermore, Kivy criticizes the “historically authentic performance 
movement”, because it is “a project aimed at collapsing performance into 
text” (1995, 277), and holds that the gap between performance and text is 
desirable, so that music remains a performing art. 
To sum up, Kivy suggests on the one hand, that musical inauthenticity, 
as infidelity to the musical work as text, is neither a moral evil nor an artistic 
demerit; on the contrary, it seems to be ontologically required for the musi-
cal performance to be a performance. On the other hand, the expressive 
authenticity of the performers is necessary for the artistic quality of the per-
formance. 
I agree. So on this basis I will develop my thesis on the authenticity of 
musical improvisation. 
 
2. Musical Authenticity and Improvisational Inauthenticity 
 
While strongly defending performance authenticity as truthfulness to the 
work, Julian Dodd has elaborated on the idea that a performance not faithful 
to the work as a text, which in this sense is inauthentic, can be artistically 
successful. “Musical authenticity” may mean either “score compliance au-
thenticity” (Dodd 2012, 1), which consists in rendering the score faithfully, 
and in “being faithful to the composer’s work-determinative instructions” 
(2014, 281), or “interpretive authenticity,” which, in Dodd’s words, is 
“a kind of faithfulness” to the musical work, which consists in “evincing 
a deeper understanding of the work performed” and allows the abandoning 
of “ideal fidelity to the score” in order to achieve “a more successful perfor-
mance” which is “true to the work by interpreting it in a way that displays 
insight into its nature” (2012, 10, 17, 9). 
Leaving aside complications (in Dodd’s formulation it remains for exam-
ple unclear what the “nature” of a work is), the important point is that in 
any case musical authenticity, as faithfulness to the work, is incompatible 
with improvisation. In improvised music, authenticity is not a “performance 
value,” Dodds argues, because “improvised music [is] music in which what 
really matters is  c o p i n g  w i t h  c h a l l e n g e s  i n  t h e  m o-
m e n t  rather than being true to the work performed” (2014, 281). In other 
words: “Where improvisation disregards the work as scored, interest for 
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improvisation overrides interest for the work as scored. In this sense, there 
is a tension between improvisation and score-compliance. We may call this 
the i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y  t h e s i s.”3 
This thesis is generally right, I think, but some qualifications are in order. 
First, as musicological and ethnomusicological research has now defini-
tively clarified, many improvisational musical practices are not centered 
around notions like work and composition and “improvisation is better un-
derstood in terms of the learning and application of culturally acquired, so-
cially mediated, and embodied skills.”4 In improvisational practices of oral 
traditions, Free Jazz, a free improvisation, there is no work to be performed. 
In this case, we cannot reasonably say that improvisation is inauthentic, 
in Dodd’s sense, because there is no work to be unfaithful to. The perfor-
mance can neither be authentic nor inauthentic (in that sense). Authenticity, 
as truthfulness to the work, is irrelevant here, so we may call this the 
i r r e l e v a n c e  t h e s i s.  In these practices (Free Jazz, Free improvisa-
tion, and improvisation practices of oral traditions), it makes no sense to 
define improvisation in terms of deviation from the score and inauthenticity. 
Rather, the aesthetic dimension of these practices is understood if we grasp 
its historical, social, and cultural dimension.5 
Secondly, recent empirical studies demonstrate that unintentional im-
provisation is unavoidable in performing a rendition of a musical work, even 
in the Classical tradition of performances of work-as-scored.6 Hence, if there 
are authentic renditions of musical works, then musical improvisation does 
not prevent a performance from being authentic. However, this remark does 
not imply an insurmountable difficulty for the i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y 
t h e s i s. One may think that unintentional, unavoidable improvisation is 
not relevant: we rather need reasons for admitting or rejecting the possible 
authenticity of  i n t e n t i o n a l  improvisation. 
Thirdly, in some cases improvising is following the composer’s instruc-
tions for a correct performance of the work. In Western ‘classical’ music we 
can find examples of this in the practices of the figured bass, of the free ca-
denza or in the ‘open’ or ‘undetermined’ works of the avant-garde. In these 
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4 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing me on this point and for the nice formu-
lation I allow myself to incorporate in the text. 
5 See Treitler 1991; Berliner 1994; Nettl et al. 1998; Lewis 2004; Nettl et al. 2009. See 
also footnotes 9 and 14. 
6 See Schiavio, Høffding 2015; Seddon, Biasutti 2009, 35. 
M u s i c a l  A u t h e n t i c i t y . . .  13 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________   
 
cases the musical score prescribes improvisation as authentic means for 
performing the work. When improvisation is required by the musical work’s 
instructions (according to a given musical practice), then improvisation is 
both a necessary condition for the correct performance of the musical work 
and is still an improvisation. Within these practices, authentic performances, 
i.e. performances compliant with the score, are improvisational (or, if you 
prefer, involve improvisation): so this limits the scope of the  i n c o m-
p a t i b i l i t y  t h e s i s.  Of course the score’s instructions and musical 
practice’s conventions constrain performers’ improvisational freedom. 
If the score of a Baroque work prescribes improvisation for 12 bars, and the 
performers improvise for 30 bars in a Free Jazz style, then the improvised 
performance is unfaithful to the work and, in this sense, inauthentic. 
However it would be inauthentic as a wrong (improvisational) performance, 
not as improvisation  p e r  s e. 
In other cases, for instance a Jazz rendition of a tune, “performers do not 
wait for the composer’s permission or prescription before becoming impro-
visers. They freely decide to improvise, taking advantage of the composer’s 
work for their performing aims” (Bertinetto 2012, 115). Unfaithfulness to 
the work-as-scored is required by the artistic practice and, consequently, 
here improvisation is inauthentic. Yet, as Dodd thinks,  t h i s  kind of inau-
thenticity does not imply a default artistic demerit of improvised music. 
On the contrary, an authentic performance, as faithful to the scored work, 
would be contrary to the practice here: it would amount to playing the 
wrong game (although, as I will argue at the end of the paper, playing 
a wrong game can result in the invention of a new artistically successful 
game). 
However, as Kivy has already shown, the semantic spectrum of the no-
tion of authenticity is broad and diverse. So, my point is that both the  i n-
c o m p a t i b i l i t y  t h e s i s  and the  i r r e l e v a n c e  t h e s i s 
do not rule out or hinder the idea that improvisation may be authentic in 
other relevant ways. Once we acknowledge other kinds of musical authentic-
ity, we can defend the idea that musical improvisation and authenticity are 
not mutually exclusive and argue that a certain kind of authenticity is a key 
artistic value of musical improvisation. 
I think that what I will advocate is valid for standard Jazz, in which im-
provisers can be expressively authentic, as explained by Kivy, although play-
ing performances that, in Dodd’s interpretation, are inauthentic with re-
spect to the musical work (perhaps regarding tunes such as  M y  F u n-
n y  V a l e n t i n e,  I n  a  S e n t i m e n t a l  M o o d,  M y  F a v o r i t e 
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T h i n g s,  and ‘R o u n d  M i d n i g h t  I would rather speak more sim-
ply of ‘composition’ instead of ‘musical work.’ However, I have discussed the 
issue elsewhere (Bertinetto 2012)7 and here I will not discuss it any further). 
I am also thinking about improvisational performances that do not refer to 
compositions, as in Keith Jarrett’s famous  K ö l n  C o n c e r t , ‘Free’ Jazz, 
and ‘free’8 improvisation of different kinds (from G r u p p o  d i  I m-
p r o v v i s a z i o n e  N u o v a  C o n s o n a n z a  and  M u s i c a 
E l e t t r o n i c a  V i v a  to the new avant-garde scene of contemporary 
B e r l i n  E c h t z e i t m u s i k  and improvising Laptop ensembles, only 
to make a few examples), in reference to which the notion of inauthenticity 
with respect to a composition does not apply, because in fact there are no 
compositions (at least in the common sense of the word). However, I believe 
that my thesis can be extended to the use of improvisation at least within the 
history of Western music. Not only forms of Popular music of oral tradition 
and Rock (the kinds of music Vincenzo Caporaletti has called “audiotactile” 
(Caporaletti 2005), but also Medieval and Baroque music and Classical music 
(in regard, for example, to the cadenza of a concerto) culturally centered 
around the notion of a musical work.9 In all these cases where the music is 
improvised, improvisers can be more or less expressively authentic (in some 
cases; in others not, being inauthentic in Dodd’s sense). 
 
3. Authentic Improvisations 
 
Improvisation can rightly be understood as authentic in at least three senses: 
o n t o l o g i c a l, e x p r e s s i v e  and s i t u a t i o n a l - r e s p o n-
s i v e. I will label this third kind of authenticity ‘t r u t h f u l n e s s  t o 
t h e  m o m e n t.’ Especially this last sense of authenticity constitutes the 
specific way improvisation realizes a fourth kind of authenticity: a r t i s-
t i c  a u t h e n t i c i t y. In this section I will deal with the first two senses, 
while in the next sections I will focus on the other two. I will suggest, first, to 
                                                 
7 Here I argue that, pace Davies 2001 and others, a jazz improvised performance of 
a tune is a performance of that tune. See Bertinetto 2016a. 
8 An improvisation is free in the sense of being unconstrained by scores, themes and 
harmonic grids, but it is never ex nihilo: it feeds on traditions, practices, styles, exercise, 
habits, etc. 
9 For the philosophical history of this notion see Goehr 1992. For different forms of 
improvisation in different historical musical practices see Gioia 1988; Rinzler 2008; 
Lothwesen 2009; Santi 2010; Guaccero 2013; Sbordoni 2014; Saladin 2014; Feige 2014; 
Guido 2017. See also footnotes 5 and 14. 
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consider ‘truthfulness to the moment’ as the specific meaning of improvisa-
tional authenticity and, second, to understand improvisational authenticity 
as paradigmatic for artistic authenticity. 
 
(a) Ontological authenticity 
 
In the field of philosophy of art, authenticity is commonly understood as that 
quality for which an artwork is materially the object attributable to a partic-
ular author as its producer. This kind of authenticity concerns the empirical 
question of the work’s authorship. An authentic artwork is what it should be: 
it is the ‘genuine’ object, not its substitute. Therefore the authentic artistic 
object is identified by differentiation from other objects, such as copies 
(or falsifications) and cases of plagiarism, which occur when authorship is 
attributed to someone who is not the true, or authentic, author of the artistic 
object (see Dutton 2003). 
Improvisation is authentic in this sense  d e f i n i t i o n a l l y. For un-
derstanding this point, we may resort to the etymology of the word ‘authen-
ticity’. As simultaneous coincidence of invention and realization,10 improvi-
sation is  o n t o l o g i c a l l y  authentic in the etymological meaning of the 
word. Consider, 1.  a u t h e n t e i n  and 2.  a u t h e n t i k ó s  respec-
tively mean: 1. ‘to accomplish something, oneself,’ ‘to do independently,’ 
‘to bear authority on something,’ and 2. ‘being handmade.’ There is surely 
nothing more handmade than an improvisation: improvisers don’t do what 
somebody else prescribes them to do, but act autonomously, bearing author-
ity on what they are doing. Of course, as previously seen, performers may 
improvise in order to follow a composer’s instructions that set limits on the 
scope of their improvisation. Moreover, a performer often improvises while 
interplaying with other musicians and accordingly to the performance’s 
specific and concrete situation. Finally, at times improvisers play without 
consciously deciding what to do (also because their intentions are developed 
through the action) (Bertinetto 2015, 10). However, the point is that—per-
haps relative to what they improvise within the constraints set by a com-
poser—improvisers (individually and/or jointly) are nevertheless  a r t i s-
t i c a l l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  for what they do:11 they are authors, not 
                                                 
10 I take this as a commonsensical minimal definition of improvisation, although I am 
perfectly aware that improvisation is not “creatio ex nihilo” and  d e  f a c t o  the si-
multaneous coincidence between invention and realization is a matter of degree. 
11 This holds true even when artistic creativity, as exemplarily shown by improvisa-
tion, is due to the artist’ lost of control of what emerges through her interactions with the 
material, the mental and the social environment of the performance.  
16  A l e s s a n d r o  B e r t i n e t t o  
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
merely interpreters. To sum up: if a musical performance is improvised, it is 
ontologically authentic in this sense: improvisers are the real producers of 
the music they perform. 
However, this ontological authenticity of improvisation could be judged 
as not relevant enough for the artistic value of improvisation, in that it is too 
general: every improvisation, and even every action, is authentic in this 
sense. Moreover, etymology is not enough in philosophy. We must search for 
other ways for understanding improvisational authenticity. 
 
(b) Expressive authenticity and improvisation 
 
The meaning of authenticity that can be applied in a plausible and interest-
ing way to improvisation is already available to us. I am referring to Kivy’s 
notion of  e x p r e s s i v e  a u t h e n t i c i t y. As “the faithfulness to the 
performer’s own self” (Kivy 1995, 7), i.e. as the talent of musically shaping 
and/or expressing the performer’s self, being true to it in concrete perform-
ing situations,  e x p r e s s i v e  authenticity is one of the aesthetic ideals of 
musical improvisation. 
The expressive authenticity of improvisation may be conceived of in con-
trast to musical expressiveness as a medium for revealing a musical work’s 
emotional qualities or even the composer’s emotional life. As defended by 
Clémént Canonne (2013) (see Bertinetto 2016b), the expressiveness of mu-
sical improvisation is direct and immediate. Accordingly, musical improvisa-
tion is marked by the concomitance between the musical and the emotional 
flux underpinning the generation of the music of which the improviser is 
author. Hence, an improvised performance is  t r a n s p a r e n t, in that it 
does not borrow the emotions expressed by someone else, but manifests the 
performers’ emotions and moods in the moment of their arising in a specific 
situation. 
However, nothing assures that what ensues from the artists’ hearts, de-
spite being ‘naturally’ authentic, is also artistically valuable. A manifestation 
of emotions may be authentic in this sense, but one may reasonably doubt 
that it is also artistically valuable. Indeed, like in other artistic practices, 
in improvisation expressiveness is not (at least, not only) a passive and im-
mediate outpouring of feelings, but an active and articulated configuration 
through an artistic medium. As already argued by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel (1975), musical expressiveness, in particular, shows the dynamic de-
velopment of emotions and feeling, while sonically shaping them through 
time. The specificity of musical improvisation, in this regard, is the possibil-
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ity of musically articulating emotions and feeling as they develop during the 
performance. Not only that: the physical exteriorization of the affectivity 
through which musicians react to the expressiveness of the music they play 
affects in turn the expressive quality of the music generated. It is a process of 
s e l f - s t i m u l a t i o n: musical expressiveness stimulates affective reac-
tions shown by musicians’ corporeal expression, and this in turn stimulates 
the production of particular musical expressions, while coping with artistic 
challenges in the moment of the performance. 
This seems to fit with the widespread view of improvisation as “the 
means by which we acquire selfhood,” that is, as a means “of self-generation” 
as Vijay Iyer (2016, 88) writes. Expressiveness is not (at least not always) 
merely the revelation of the performer’s inner life and, accordingly, the goal 
of musical improvisation is not uncovering or discovering some truer or 
authentic inner self (see Foster 2016, 222): it is rather the  s h a p i n g  of 
personalities, in interaction with other personalities as well as with (and 
within) the concrete situation of the performance and the cultural tradition 
of the musical practice at issue. It is the shaping of responsive artistic per-
sonalities: personalities that form themselves through the music they play, 
responding, in the moment of the performance, to others players and to the 
audience, to their own musical tradition, to the situation of the performance, 
and to the events occurring during its course. 
Personalities develop through the actions performed by individuals. 
Authenticity, in this sense, is an ongoing work: it is not the simple expressive 
revelation of a fixed self, but the expression of the creative task of shaping 
a self through the actions performed. In a way, as Charles Taylor (2003, 62) 
defended, artistic creativity is the paradigm of this expressive shaping of 
personality, because an important part of the artists’ work consists in taking 
responsibility for their artistic expressions and, in so doing, shaping an artis-
tic personality (Bertinetto 2018, 97–98). 
We can appreciate the relevance of this idea for improvisational authen-
ticity if we connect it with the view of improvisational expressivity as shap-
ing of the performer’s self, i.e. with the idea that “personality is a central 
product of all improvisation” (Hampton 2016, 235). As a result, it is not 
farfetched to conceive of improvisation as the epitome of the artistic con-
struction/expression of personality in real-time. 
In conclusion, the correction of the  t r a n s p a r e n c y  t h e s i s  by 
means of a  c o n s t r u c t i v i s t  v i e w  of improvisational expressive-
ness explains how improvisation can be authentic in a relevant artistic sense. 
Improvisation presents on the stage the articulation of this exercise of crea-
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tivity, which involves shaping and expressing creative personalities in their 
interaction with a specific situation. If a condition for the success of improvi-
sation is undeniably to cope with the challenges in the moment, those chal-
lenges are artistic and expressive ones, not only technical ones. Authenticity, 
as an aesthetic quality, applies to musical improvisation specifically in this 
sense: improvisation is authentic when the musical performance expresses 
the performers’ selves  u n d e r  c o n s t r u c t i o n, or, still better, in the 
moment of their construction and as an ongoing construction, in creative 
interaction with other performers and with a given situation. 
 
4. Improvisational Authenticity as Being True to the Moment 
 
Obviously the artistic significance of this expressive authenticity comes more 
to the fore in those musical practices in which improvisation has a greater 
scope. The expressive authenticity of improvisation has as such a specific 
aspect that differentiates it from the expressive authenticity of the interpre-
tation of musical works. As I will suggest later on, thanks to this specificity, 
improvisation is paradigmatic for music as a performing art (and the fact 
that music is a performing art is a key aspect of musical authenticity: Kivy 
agrees with current musicological research in this regard12). 
This specific aspect of improvisational expressive authenticity may be 
called  ‘t r u t h f u l n e s s  t o  t h e  m o m e n t.’  In fact, the expressive 
musical gestures of improvisers have to deal not only with the constraints of 
a composition, a theme or a harmonic grid (if we are considering what we 
can call ‘constrained’ improvisation), but also with what happens during the 
performance. If we consider ‘free’ improvisation, we could then say that the 
expressiveness of the improvisers is configured as a search for a way to be 
true to the moment. By the formulation ‘being true to the moment,’ I mean 
this: since improvised music is the invention of what is played in the mo-
ment (or ‘on the spot’) in  t h i s  situation  h e r e  a n d  n o w,  improvis-
ers must musically do what is appropriate here and now. This involves re-
sponding creatively to what is happening here and now, in the course and 
in the flow of the performance, shaping and showing in this way aspects of 
the artist’s own artistic personality, of the artist’s own voice, in interaction 
with the situation which is developing in the moment. 
                                                 
12 See for example Taruskin 1995 and Cook 2013. 
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My point, then, is that “coping with challenges in the moment”13 is of 
artistic merit, if it can be understood not only in terms of solving technical 
problems (for example, problems of coordination between performers), but 
as ‘being true to the moment’, i.e. as kind of authenticity. 
Hence, expressive authenticity in improvisation is  k a i r o l o g i c a l,  
k a i r ó s  being the time of the right moment, i.e. of the moment in which 
the opportune choice is made and/or the opportune action is performed. 
However, it is not just about doing the right thing when the opportunity 
arises. It is rather about finding/inventing suitable opportunities for the 
(musically) right thing, responding to what is emerging out of the impro-
vised performance. Of course, in an improvisational situation improvisers 
cannot completely  f o r e s e e  whether what they do is right or opportune 
or ‘true to the moment.’ What they do can be assessed as right or wrong—
i.e. true to the moment—only in retrospect, when the moment is passed, 
thanks to others’ reactions (musical and behavioral inputs by fellow per-
formers and, in a live performance, the audience’s responses) and to their 
own reactions to what they did. 
The improviser’s art consists in exhibiting a fine sensitivity for the mo-
ment, both in the sense of the precise moment in which the performance is 
happening, and in the sense of the concrete situation and specific condition 
of the performance (the kind of audience, the type of location, the members 
of the group, the kind of music played, the sort of artistic event, etc.) without 
being able to grasp the moment before it happens or to dominate from the 
outside the situation of which they are a part. 
This view of improvisational authenticity respects the ‘existentialist’ idea 
that for individuals to be (ethically) authentic requires becoming responsible 
for themselves, reflexively (see Ferrara 1998) taking a stance toward their 
contingent situations, which opens up an interesting sense of  a r t i s t i c 
authenticity. If authenticity consists “in assuming one’s proper possibilities 
as a free and situated revealing of the world” and, consequently, in being 
“able to make one’s existence, and one’s world, one’s own” (Baugh 1988, 
479),  then, applying this notion of authenticity to the artistic sphere, artistic 
authenticity, i.e. the aesthetic authenticity of an artwork, consists in cre-
atively dealing with its contingent situation. A r t i s t i c  a u t h e n t i c-
i t y  may be defined as the successful practical and potentially transforma-
tive reflection on the normative conditions of an artistic practice and on the 
empirical situation of the artistic production through a specific artwork or 
                                                 
13 This, I recall, is what the task of musical improvisation consists of according to 
Dodd 2014, 281. 
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performance. Musical improvisation, thus, epitomizes artistic authenticity, 
since its aesthetic success requires assuming responsibility toward the spe-
cific situation of the performance and making the contingency of the mo-
ment a creative artistic resource. 
It could be observed, and maybe objected to, that the view I have de-
fended so far about the expressive authenticity of improvisation as truthful-
ness to the moment is (exaggeratedly) individualistic and that therefore its 
validity is limited to those musical genres in which the soloist, the virtuoso, 
the artistic genius are the protagonists. So my view could work for the i m-
p r o m p t u  cadence of a concert or for the solo improvisation of a pianist, 
or for the performance on a Jazz standard in which musicians in turn per-
form their solos. But it would miss the point of other improvisational prac-
tices, like collective Free improvisation and Free Jazz. Indeed, on closer 
inspection, this individualistic conception would be misleading even in re-
spect to the previous cases, given that, as rightly defended by many schol-
ars,14 “a musician’s voice and the music that is improvised is not just an indi-
vidual achievement, but a result of collective action of musicians, in a recip-
rocal relation with their instruments, the constraints of a genre, and the 
wider social context in which they are active.”15 
However, my view is far from being individualistic. I reject the idea that 
individual artistic expression (their style) is incompatible with the belonging 
of the individual to collectivities and with their being part of traditions of 
social, artistic, and musical practices. As Charles Taylor (2013, 91) claims, 
authenticity as being truthful to one’s own personality, while (inter)acting in 
specific contingent situations is not “the enemy of demands that emanate 
from beyond the self” (tradition, genre, work). In the field of art, those de-
mands become elements of the artists’ personalities. In their practice, artists, 
including improvisers, discover and understand those demands and their 
artistic obligations towards traditions, genres, and works. Indeed, the nor-
mative force of traditions, genres, and works is activated by artistic negotia-
tions, transformations, and adaptations, so that traditions, genres, and works 
become constitutive elements of the artists’ personalities that, in turn, de-
velop while interacting with traditions, genres, and works. The same goes for 
the interaction between the individual performer and the group: the indi-
vidual configures and transforms their personality through their relation-
                                                 
14 Monson 1996; Benson 2003; Fishlin, Heble 2004; Borgo 2006; Hagberg 2008; 
Bertinetto et al. 2015; Hagberg 2016; Born et al. 2017; Peters 2017; Sbordoni et al. 2018. 
15 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing me on this point and for the nice for-
mulation I allow myself to insert in the text. 
M u s i c a l  A u t h e n t i c i t y . . .  21 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________   
 
ships and the context in which they live, to the life of which they contributes 
in their own way. The individual musicians shape and transform their style 
through the group, to the style of which they contributes in their own way.16 
In musical improvisation, these interactions happen especially and princi-
pally in the moment of the performance, through the way the group, and the 
individuals inside the group, try to be true to the moment, by means of nego-
tiating performatively (musically and socially) their reciprocal relations, 
with different results and not without the possibility of conflicts.17 
The notion of ‘truthfulness to the moment’, as I have explained it, nicely 
captures musical improvisation’s specific kind of expressive authenticity. 
Moreover, it has two additional advantages. On the one hand this notion can 
be extended, with specific appropriate adjustments, to other forms of artistic 
improvisation, especially in performing arts such as dance and theater. 
A fine sensibility for the opportune moment articulated through a sort of 
‘grammar of contingency’18 seems to be a requirement for good improvisa-
tional performances in all performing arts. With this notion, at first blush 
maybe obscure, I mean a variety of ways and means, specific to each tradi-
tion and style of artistic improvisation and, ultimately, to each performer, 
and ‘plastically’ variable according to the performing situation, for dealing 
creatively with the unexpected moment, making it the opportune moment. 
On the other hand, improvisational authenticity as ‘truthfulness to the 
moment’ is a key aspect of all musical performances, including performances 
of musical work, in that, precisely as performances, they must not only re-
produce and interpret a musical work, but must do so at a specific time and 
in a concrete situation. First, the perspective on the musical work perform-
ers have in a certain situation influences the way they interpret it. Second, in 
performing a work, performers may be differently sensitive with respect to 
the performance conditions and to what happens during the performance 
itself. The ability to respond felicitously to the environmental conditions 
(the spatial and acoustic setting of the location, the kind of listeners and their 
expectations, etc.) or to performers’ musical and social behavior (for exam-
                                                 
16 A view of this kind is proposed by Cobussen 2012. 
17 An aesthetic conflict occurred for instance between Miles Davis and John Coltrane 
during their last concert together in Paris on March, 21st 1960 (CD: Miles Davis & John 
Coltrane, The final tour: Paris, March 21, 1960, Columbia Records). 
18 I thank Bruno Besana (personal communication) for suggesting to me this nice 
formulation in a personal communication. “Grammar” is to be understood in a Wittgen-
steinian sense as a plural network of norms capable of giving meaning to our practices 
from within the practices themselves. For an articulation of this notion see my Bertinetto 
(forthcoming). 
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ple, the gestures of the orchestra conductor and the personal interactions 
between performers) is an important ingredient not only of the expressive 
authenticity of the individual and of the ensemble, but of the specific way 
score compliance and truthfulness to the work are achieved. Instead, per-
formers who are not truthful to the moment are ‘not in the zone,’ ‘not in the 
mood,’ not really there. They are not attentive and responsive and this will 
result in a probable cause of failure, in that it will impede bringing the musi-
cal work into that  situation in that  moment, thereby hindering a successful 
transmission of the work to the listeners’ ears, hindering the achievement 
of the goal of this musical practice. Hence, improvisational authenticity is 
paradigmatic of an aspect which, to different degree, concerns all musical 
performances in as much they are  p e r f o r m a n c e s  and not texts 
(Kivy 1995, 270–277). 
 
5. Improvisation, Truthfulness to the Moment  
and Artistic Normativity 
 
By stressing the paradigmatic character of improvisational authenticity for 
music as a performing art, I am far from denying that performing a work-as- 
-scored and improvising are two different practices. Still, in both cases, mu-
sic, as a performing art, is played here and now. Hence, each performance 
requires specific attention to and responsive negotiation with the conditions 
of the performance. 
This requirement is normative and may be made explicit with this formu-
la: ‘if you want to perform music well, you ought to be true to the moment, 
i.e. attentive and responsive to the specific situation of the performance.’ 
Truthfulness to the moment is a necessary condition for the practice of mu-
sical performance. 
The normative import of this kind of authenticity is, I argue, broader than 
the normative import of the truthfulness to the work. Indeed, as nicely ar-
gued in a recent paper by Guy Rohrbaugh (2019),19 score compliance is an 
end in itself as it is the ‘goodness’ of the practice of performing musical 
works in the Western classical tradition: it is not a reason for achieving some 
end, but is constitutive of that practice. Hence, if we do not respect score 
compliance, we are not ‘true to the practice,’ and this is how authenticity as 
‘being true to the work-as-scored’ has been defended by philosophers such 
as Stephen Davies and Julian Dodd. 
                                                 
19 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing me to this paper. 
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However, being not true to that practice does not amount to not being 
true to music as a performance. Of course, being true to that practice allows 
us to promote specific musical values, for example a kind of symbolic and 
algorithmic complexity (as in the structural architectures of a Brahms’ sym-
phony) that only a notation allows to build and only the accurate perfor-
mance of a work-as-scored can then realize musically. But other practices 
promote other values. The practice of improvisation, clearly in free improvi-
sational situations, promotes another kind of complexity: the complexity of 
self-organized recursive processes that have the situation and the moment 
of their occurring among their constitutive elements. What complexity we 
choose is a matter of the ‘goodness’ we prefer. And the preference we have 
depends, in turn, on (how we understand and appreciate) the practice we 
are in. Hence, deficiency in score compliance is not an artistic flaw per se: 
it is not always an artistic deficiency. It depends from the practice we are in. 
Following Wittgenstein, “we make up the rules as we go along” (1953): the 
normativity of our practices is generated within the practices. Hence, the 
validity of the norms of the practice depends on the force that performers 
assign to it within the practice itself. In relation to the issue of musical 
authenticity, this may be interpreted in a ‘narrow’ and in a ‘large’ way. 
The ‘narrow’ way can be articulated in terms of David Davies’ pragma-
tism: the “properties taken to be normative” for a correct performance can-
not be “characterized independently of the ways in which performances are 
or would be classified” as correct or incorrect instances of the work “within 
a particular historically situated performative practice” (2012, 653) . The 
criteria for correct performances are located not only in “explicit rules for 
following scores, but also in the practical interactions between composers, 
performers, and receivers in a particular musical context” (2012, 656). 
The ‘broad’ way can be articulated in terms closer to Georg Bertram’s 
(2018) conception of art as human practice: the ‘goodness’ that constitutes 
the practice is valid if the participants in the practice make it valid  
t h r o u g h  the practice, that is, if it is,  f o r  t h e m, i n  t h e i r 
p r a c t i c e,  an end in itself. Which means that the validity of score com-
pliance depends on whether performers make it valid by enforcing it as 
a ‘goodness’ in their practices. The point is that musicians may not consider 
score compliance as  t h e i r  ‘goodness’ and perform the work in such 
a way that appropriate it, creatively making it an ingredient of a different 
practice, not grounded on score compliance, but, for instance, on the emo-
tional and communicative powers of music. 
24  A l e s s a n d r o  B e r t i n e t t o  
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Therefore, score compliance, as such, is not  always a necessary condi-
tion of the artistic success or the artistic authenticity of the performance. 
In fact, the explicit and intentional violation of what, within the context of 
a musical practice, is understood as the musical content of a musical work 
may indeed produce, through a shift of practice, highly valuable perfor-
mances. Jimi Hendrix’s Woodstock’s performance of the American national 
anthem, as well as John Coltrane version of ‘My Favorite Things’ are valued 
as artistically authentic and successful in this sense, even though, while 
s i g n i f y i n g  on those musical pieces, they distort what in other prac-
tices is understood as their musical content (see Bartel 2011), i.e. even 
though score compliance is not their ‘goodness’. There are no  a  p r i o r i 
reasons that can prevent performers from avoiding score compliance and 
appropriatively violating what is commonly understood as the musical 
content of the pieces they are playing. As a matter of fact, it cannot be known 
in advance whether this appropriative violation will succeed, or not, artisti-
cally. 
The artistic success of an artwork or of a performance cannot be guaran-
teed by the application or the violation of rules, conventions, and criteria 
that constitute a practice. What makes artistic success, i.e. the artistic 
authenticity of the work, possible is rather the creative way in which the 
work or the performance interacts on the moment, in the specific situation 
of its production, with rules, conventions and criteria. In other words, what 
is at stake in artistic authenticity is the specific way the artwork or the per-
formance deals with the normativity of a practice, that is, how it reflects 
practically on the normative conditions of the practice, potentially trans-
forming them. Not score compliance as the abstract ‘goodness’ of a practice, 
but the specific way in which this or another ‘goodness’ is achieved in this 
particular situation, is what matters artistically. 
Consequently, I argue that score compliance is a necessary, but not suffi-
cient, condition for the artistic success of musical practices based on score 
compliance; but it is not a necessary condition for artistic success generally 
(artistic success in music does not always require score compliance). 
Instead, ‘being true to the moment’ is always a ‘goodness’ of a musical per-
formance as an artistic practice, in that each performance requires a negotia-
tion with the conditions of the performance: ‘truthfulness to the moment’ is 
a necessary condition for the artistic success of a musical performance. 
In improvisation, I dare say, it is also a sufficient condition. Truthfulness 
to the moment is the  r a i s o n  d ’ ê t r e  of musical improvisation. This 
makes improvisation paradigmatic for music, in its entirety, as a performing 
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art (see Bertinetto 2016a). The artistic authenticity of music (‘being true to 
the music’) is ‘being true to the moment’ of the performance. In an improvi-
sation the meaning and the value of what is played is articulated through the 
way performers respond to what is happening in the moment. The authen-
ticity of the music is due to the way performers creatively shape and express 
artistic personalities in interaction with each other as well as with the tradi-
tion of their practice, responding to the challenges and the affordances of 
the contingent situation. But also in the performance of a musical work, mu-
sic is as it is performed in the present moment. The specific artistic authen-
ticity of the performance is, even in this case, negotiated in the practice and, 
ultimately, in the performance itself: i.e. in the moment when the music is 
played. 
In conclusion, the most relevant sense of authenticity in music is impro-
visational authenticity: being (artistically, aesthetically, and expressively) 
true to the moment; being able to respond in a creatively successful way to 
the demands that ensue from the artistic interaction with a situation, with 
other players, with the audience, as well as with a genre, a tradition, a musi-
cal work, thereby displaying the shaping of the artistic personality of the 
performers and creatively shaping artistic meaning. 
Of course, I do not mean that improvisation, as a specific musical practice, 
is more artistically valuable than the performance of compositions (this 
would be silly, exactly like the opposite view). My point is rather that being 
true to the moment, i.e. improvisational authenticity, amounts to being true 
to the music  t o u t  c o u r t  as a performing art. Musical improvisation is 
not trivially inauthentic: rather, its authenticity is paradigmatic for musical 
authenticity.20  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 This paper originated as a talk given at the University of Murcia (29.03.2017), at the 
Conference Authenticity versus Improvisation in the Philosophy of Music? (Bern, Switzer-
land, 19–20.05.2017), and at the European Society for Aesthetics Conference 2017 (Berlin, 
25–27.05.2017). I thank all the participants and especially Maria José Alcaraz, Georg Ber-
tram, Matilde Carrasco, Julian Dodd, Giovanni Matteucci, Roger Pouivet, Marcello Ruta, 
Salvador Rubio Marco, and Alberto Voltolini, for their precious comments. I also thank 
three anonymous referees for their invaluable work. I am very grateful to the research 
project “Aesthetic experience of the arts and the complexity of perception” (FFI 2015–
64271–P) of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness and to the Alexander 
von Humboldt Foundation for their generous financial support. 
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